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SOME REMARKS UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF

MUNICIPALITIES SUGGESTED BY THE EXPE-

RIENCE, GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT

OF THE CITY OF GRAND RAPIDS.

BY JUDQE JOHN W. CHAMPL1N.

The municipal government of the city of Grand

Rapids has not in all respects been entirely successful.

Dissatisfaction has manifested itself in parts of the com-

munity, especially in that portion which has to bear the

burthen of taxation on account of increasing bonded in-

debtedness and the great increase of expenditures in carry-

ing on the affairs of the city. Lack of discrimination in

the objects of expenditure, and disregard of legal limita-

tions upon the authority of the council, have caused

uneasiness and comment. Notwithstanding these, the

city has grown in population and material wealth, and I

can say without self-adulation, is a pushing, thriving and

beautiful city. Incorporated in 1850 with a population

of about three thousand, it has grown until it puts forth

a claim of over eighty thousand inhabitants. The study

of its development will disclose, as in the case of every

modern city, at first a frugal administration of its affairs

by men well fitted for the places to which they were

elected; and as wealth and population increased, there

was exhibited a decided tendency to increased expendi-

ture and lavish disposition of the public moneys.

The administration of municipal affairs up to the
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establishment of the Board of Public Works was based
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upon local self-government by aldermen elected from

the different wards. The only legal qualification required

was, that they should be electors and reside in the ward

in which they were elected. As the population of the

city increased, aldermen were elected who could not be

ranked as the representative men of their wards. They

were not the successful business men of their wards, nor

were they men of any considerable property holdings.

They were the average alderman of the generation,, such

as fill that position in the most of our American cities.

They were nominated by the ward caucuses, and the cau-

cus was composed of men whose interest in city affairs

merely extended to local appointments, or henchmen of

interested contractors for street improvements. Many of

the improvements made were not satisfactorily planned

or faithfully executed. A city hall was to be built, and

large sums of money were to be expended; water work6

were to be constructed, and an extensive plan of sewer-

age to be inaugurated; engine houses were to be built,

and police protection assured. To accomplish these pur-

poses, it was felt that the various committees of the Com-

mon Council would be inadequate, both on account of

the personnel of the body and the temporary term of the

offices of aldermen; and so a Board of Public Works was

established consisting of five members, to whom the plans

of the improvement and execution of the work should be
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intrusted after it was inaugurated by the Council.

Favoritism in the appointment of the officers and

members of the fire and police departments, and its in-

efficiency under the administration of the Council,

brought about the establishment of the Fire and Police

Board.

The public schools and matters of education, formerly

under the supervision of the Common Council, are now

MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OF GRAND RAPIDS. 3

confided to a Board of Education. The Board of Edu-

cation is a corporation entirely independent of the city

government. The members of the Board are elected by

the votes of male electors and female tax-payers over

twenty-one years of age. This qualification of a voter

should be confined to the voters whose names appear on

the last tax roll and have actually paid the tax. for school

purposes.

Matters pertaining to the health of the inhabitants of

the city, which, by the original charter, were confided

to the Common Council, are now placed under the con-

trol of a Board of Health; and the burial and disposition

of the dead are placed under the Board of Cemetery

Commissioners.

Thus, it is seen, that the administration of the more im-

portant affairs of the city government is taken from the

representatives chosen by the people and vested in the sev-

eral boards. The members of these boards are not

elected by the people, but are appointed by the Mayor,

or the Mayor and Council. It is claimed for this system

that it is more efficient; that better talent and business

qualifications are secured; that the public good is not so

liable to be sacrificed or impaired by local influences

and results of primary elections. However, the initial

power is still left in the Common Council to authorize

any public improvement, either in construction of public
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buildings, of sewers, or opening or improving streets.

The Council also has a qualified negative upon the action

of the Board of Public Works in the letting of contracts

or in adopting plans or specifications for public works;

and over the Fire and Police Board in adopting or reduc-

ing its estimates of expenses and amounts to be raised

for the maintenance of these departments.

The main complaint against large municipalities where

4 MICHIGAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION.

there is no qualification of voters except citizenship, age

and residence, is that aldermanic honors are sgized and

exercised by a class of citizens unfit to have the manage-

ment and control of municipal affairs. The elective fran-

chise, like the rain from the heavens, is bestowed upon

the evil and the good, the intelligent and the ignorant,

the wealthy and the poor. The pauper brought from the

poor-house may stand at the polls beside the millionaire,

and although the question to be decided may be the

amendment or adoption of a constitution, or that of

voting bonds to be paid by taxation upon the municipal-

ity, the vote of the beggar is of eqnal efficiency to that

of the millionaire. The man without a home, or owner

of a dollar's worth of property to be taxed, may impose

a tax npon the possessor of a homestead, only, regardless

of the best interests of the city. In short, all persons of

proper age and residence, stand before the ballot box

free and equal; and it is about the only class to which

the "glittering generalities" of the Declaration of Inde-

pendence apply. I would not have it thus. The elect-

ive franchise is the most important privilege conferred

upon a citizen by a free people. The proper exercise of

this privilege lies at the foundation of all onr institutions

and laws. The citizen should be both worthy of and

qualified to exercise the right. The convicted unpar-

doned felon, the idiot, the insane and the pauper, are
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unworthy to exercise the privilege of voting. While the

Legislature has been somewhat liberal, if not lavish, in

placing the administration of our municipal affairs under

the control of boards, yet they have left to the Common

Council the most important branch of power—that which

relates to the finances of the city. This is a department

of the local government which calls for the exercise of

the most skill, the best judgment, the greatest wisdom

MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OF GRAND RAPIDS. 5

and the strictest economy. It calls for that old-time fru-

gality which requires that every one should live within

his means.

The bonded indebtedness of Grand Rapids, on April

30th, 1895, was $2,296,900. The assessed valuation was

$24,700,000. Hence, the bonded indebtedness amounts

to over nine per cent. of the whole assessed valuation of

property in the city. There is no sinking fund estab-

lished with a view to ultimate payment. The Common

Council relies upon renewing and extending the loans.

It is safe to say, that if there had been a sinking fund

the money in it would have been taken therefrom and

applied to other purposes.

The constitution provides, that the Legislature shall

place limitations upon the power of municipalities to

create indebtedness and borrow money. What is the

basis of this constitutional provision ? The social com-

pact rests upon the principle that no more taxes shall be

exacted than are necessary for the support of govern-

ment frugally administered. What is exacted more tends

to the impoverishment of the individual, and is a mis-

appropriation of his resources to that extent. Excessive

taxation leads to repudiation, and such act is dishonor-

able. Excessive taxation prevents the introduction of

industries by which a large portion of the city is sup-

ported. The merchant and the manufacturer will not
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enter, and, if there, will leave a place where the taxes

are so onerous that no profit can be realized. The capit-

alist will not build or invest in property that, through

high taxation, yields no income. There seems to be a

natural law inherent in municipalities that tends to ex-

travagance. It is so easy to vote to borrow money, that

the necessities for such borrowing, or the use to which

the money is to be put, is not considered, at least it has

6 MICHIGAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION.

no deterrent force. Hence, the necessity of some limi-

tation by the sovereignty of the State over the power of

municipalities to borrow money and issue the bonds of

the city therefor.

The charter of the city of Grand Rapids has been

subject to many amendments and revisions. The purpose

of some was to remedy defects; but others were in the

direction of larger salaries, more numerous officers, and

additional burthens upon the tax-payers. None of the

amendments or revisions were in the interest of retrench-

ment or liquidation of the indebtedness of the city. As

before stated, the Council has made no provision for a

sinking fund, or an annual tax levy to be applied to the

reduction of the municipal debt, which the charter author-

izes the CoUiicil to do, but, like the man who considered

his debt paid if he could get his creditor to take his note,

an amendment to the charter was procured, which read9

as follows: "The Common Council shall in each year

provide for the payment of the interest of the bonded

debt, or other liabilities of the city drawing interest, by

taxation on the real and personal property of the city, if

other resources are insufficient, and shall provide for the

payment of the principal of such bonded indebtedness as

it matures. For that purpose the Common Council may

issue new bonds bearing a legal rate of interest, and hav-

ing not more than twenty years to run, and dispose of
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the same.'' Accordingly, as fast as bonds mature, the

Council promptly pays them by issuing new bonds. While

this method of payment does not increase the indebted-

ness, except the liability for interest, it does not reduce

the bonded indebtedness. The taxes levied for city pur-

poses, not including school taxes for the year 1894, were

$406,591.26, or over five dollars per capita of the whole

population. In addition to this there were received from

MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OF GRAND RAPIDS. 7

liquor tax, licenses and from other sources $164,932,

making a total revenue of $571,523.26,

The assessed valuation of property in 1877 was $8,-

333,344, and in 1894 it was $24,700,000, an increase of

$16,366,656. One and a half per cent. (being the limit

of taxation) on the excess would yield $245,499. The

taxable property in the city in 1887 was $19,996,811,

and in 1894 was $24,700,000, an increase in seven years

of $4,703,189, permitting a tax levy of one and one-half

per cent., equal to $70,546, upon such excess, and the

levy has been made up to the full limit. It can hardly

be doubted that such an additional sum, equivalent to

$10,000 a year, is owing in a large measure to unneces-

sary or lavish expenditure in the administration of the

affairs of the city. One would suppose that the gradual

increase of the taxable property would be more than

sufficient to meet the ordinary demands of the city gov-

ernment; but such is not the case. I quote from the re-

port of the comptroller, dated April 30th, 1895: "The

overdrafts one year ago were $63,923.79, and at the close

of business, April 20th, 1895, were $82,978.93." The

Council having taxed to the full limit allowed by law,

this amount shows the illegal expenditures made by the

Common Council. What was the remedy which the

Council sought for this state of affairs ? Not retrench-

ment—a cutting down of salaries and dispensing with
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services of employees not absolutely essential; but the

Legislature being in session, they applied to it for per-

mission to bond the city to the amount of two hundred

thousand dollars to make good the overdrafts of eighty-

two odd thousand dollars. And this without a vote of

the people upon the question, and under this legislative

authority the city has issued one hundred and fifty thou-

sand dollars in bonds and sold them.

8 MICHIGAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION.

The great financial question which hns agitated the

aldermen is not how the expenses of the city government

may be reduced, but in what way may the limit upon

taxation be raised so that the means may be at their

hands to meet the additional burdens they are annually

laying upon the tax-payers of the city. And to this end,

in the Legislature of 1895, an amendment to the charter

was enacted doing away with assessments of property by

supervisors, and constituting a Board of Assessors; and

it is expected that they will so raise the valuation of the

real and personal property in the city as to enable the

Council to raise a much larger revenue within the limits

of one and one-half per cent. upon the valuation. This

leads to an inquiry as to the cause of increased expendi-

ture and its necessity. For a number of years after the

incorporation of the city, the aldermen received a salary

of one dollar a year, and the Mayor served for no salary.

The loard of aldermen was then composed of the best

business men in the city. Their duties were as arduous

as those of the present day, and more so, as there were

no boards to carry on the work of the municipality. All

the duties now performed by the several boards were

performed by the Common Council. They met regularly

once each week, and the interests of the city were as

well cared for as they are now. Streets were opened

and streets were improved, sewers were built, and the
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poor were provided for as well as now, for about fifteen

years. Then the salaries of aldermen were increased to

one hundred dollars a year, and for several years this

salary was deemed ample and secured the services of

good business men. After a while the administration of

different departments was parcelled out to different

boards created by the Legislature, relieving the Council

of the larger part of administrative duties; but, never-
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theless, the salaries of aldermen have increased until the

total reaches the sum of $8,400 annually. The Mayor's

salary has been raised to $1,200, the clerk's from $1,000

to $2,500, with a deputy at $1,200 and three clerks at

$1,872, the latters' recompense being a per diem, mak-

ing a total for clerks of the city $5,572 annually. The

treasurer's department, which was formerly a fee office,

now costs the city $10,680 annually, the comptroller

$2,124. The city attorney for years received as compen-

sation $500. It is now $2,500, with an assistant at

$1,200, and a clerk at $780, making a total of $4,480.

The marshal, who formerly received fees and a per diem,

now receives as salary $1,300, a deputy $936, book-

keeper $624, making $2,860. Salaries of other officers

of the city have been correspondingly increased. The

salaries of the poor department alone now amount to

$4,748. These items of salaries foot up to over $40,-

000, when $3,000, twenty years ago, would more than

cover them.

Why are our cities so badly governed? Does it lie

in the organism or in the abuse of the powers conferred 2

The charters granted in the first instance to the people of

a locality are usually conservative in the powers con-

ferred, and economical in administration. Good men are

elected to fill the offices, and are willing to serve for a

nominal salary. After a while, as the city increases in
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wealth and population, amendments are procured in-

creasing the salaries of the officers and creating new

offices to be filled, thus making the office a prize to be

won for the salary it pays and the patronage it gives,

and then place-hunters succeed to the position of men of

business and integrity whose interests in the well-being

of the community were sufficient inducement to them to

sacrifice a portion of their time to promote the welfare

Hi MICHIGAN I'OLlTlr.iL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

of the city. Then follows jobbery, corruption, misinan

agement, abuse of powers conferred, and extravagance.

The natural wants of the community originating in the

natural growth of the city are not regarded; but im-

provements are undertaken in outlying districts for no

other purpose than to bring the land of some speculator

into market, regardless of the public necessity. Every

department is carried on under a high pressure, without

system or order. Expensive pavements are put down

and the burden laid upon the owners of adjoining lots,

or the city at large, only to be at once or in a very short

time torn up again to put down a sewer. The street is

again repaired, but is not as good as when first laid, and

then it is again dug up to put down gas mains, again re-

paired; and again torn up to put down water mains; and

by this time a new pavement is needed, and the coterie

of contractors who have parcelled out the city into dis-

tricts in which each is to have his share stands ready to

bid, and the lowest bidder takes the plum; but the cote-

rie knew whose plum it was before the sealed bids were

opened. The business way of improving the streets with

permanent and expensive pavements would be to first

cause all underground improvements to be made at least

a year before the pavement is put down. The law should

be so framed as to compel this to be done, whether tho

surface and underground improvements are under the con-
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trol of one department or of several. It may be safely

asserted that mismanagement and misgovernment are

not due to the local organism, but must be laid at the

door of those to whom is entrusted the management of

city affairs.

To insure faithful, energetic and wise execution of any

trust, responsibility for its right performance, and strict

accountability as to the manner of its execution, are

MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OF GRAND RAPIDS. 11

essential. This principle applies alike to private and

public trusts. In selecting a trustee to execute a private

trust, where the duty devolves upon a court, as it some-

times does, the court would choose a man qualified by

learning or experience to discharge its duties; he would

select no one but men of integrity and sobriety, and this

rule should apply in the selection of public officers, who

are in a sense trustees for the people whose affairs they

administer. Apply these principles to municipalities,

and we can at once see how they are rendered nugatory

through the way in which our charters are constructed.

A city is a single locality where rights, privileges and

burdens should be equal as near as it is possible to secure

them. The principle of responsibility and accountability

is weakened and rendered nugatory:—first, by dividing

the city into numerous wards, each represented by one or

more aldermen, generally by two. Collectively they

form the Common Council, which is the legislative, ad-

ministrative, and, in many instances, the executive de-

partment of the city government. Such a body is shorn

of responsibility. They may, as a body, be extravagant,

they may mismanage, they may abuse the trust reposed

in them so that the whole city may cry out against them,

but their individual responsibility is not to the city or

people at large, but to the majority of the voters in each

member's particular ward, and they have no difficulty in
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managing the primaries or ward caucuses. They should

be held responsible to the body of electors of the city

whose rights they have assailed, or whose privileges they

have abused.

Again, the multiplicity of wards begets an antagon-

ism between the wards in the disposition of the public

burdens. The assessing oflicer of a ward will underrate

the valuation of property in his ward, or will let it escape

12 MICHIGAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION.

taxation altogether by not rating it in order to lighten

the burden of his constituents. Also it begets a struggle

for favors in originating and carrying forward public

improvements. Each set of aldermen endeavors to have

improvements made in their particular ward in advance of

what the public interests of the city requires, and to accom-

plish this purpose they will form combinations with alder-

men from other wards, to support each other's pet meas-

ure; and thus enterprises, expensive to the tax-payer, are

undertaken, which would not be, but for this artificial

division of the city into wards.

Irresponsibility breeds corruption, and corruption

thrives in proportion as the lack of accountability exists.

The rule which requires the best men for the office is ren-

dered of no avail by cutting the city up into small terri-

tories where the ward bosses control the primaries, and

the result is, that we have men elected who are not quali-

fied for the position—who have no broad views of what

is most expedient for the city as a city—men often of nei-

ther property nor character, sometimes men of small

property and no character, and sometimes men of small

character and no property. Of course, this is not always

the case, nor is it the case in every ward; but it ought

not to be the case in any ward.

History confirms the fact here suggested, and the rec-

ord of abuses and corruption in municipal affairs is potent
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proof of the fact asserted.

But the inquiry arises, why elect such men to office <

Suppose they are nominated, that is no reason why they

should be elected. This inquiry suggests two reasons

that make it possible to elect such men. The first and

main reason is subservience to party nominations. This

influence is as all-powerful as it is pernicious. Party

nominations are made on party lines, and intelligent citi-

MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OF GRAND RAPIDS. 13

zens belonging to the party will make a wry face, but

will swallow the nomination and vote for the man, be-

cause he is the nominee of the party whom they would

not trust to manage the most unimportant affairs of their

own. There should be no party nominations in a munic-

ipal election. These belong to State and National elec-

tions. There are no party issues. Local interests are

only involved in which each and all are intersted in the

same way and to the same extent. The people, irrespect-

ive of party, should nominate in mass convention. If

the men so nominated are qualified, are honest, are capa.

ble, no matter to which political party they belong, they

should be elected. If a nomination so made is not satis-

factory, another meeting in mass convention should be

called, and another nomination made irrespective of

party. And so there would be a people's ticket and a

citizens' ticket to be voted for.

Another reason why it is possible to select unworthy

men, is the very broad qualification of electors. Men of

no property—men who are vagrants, or mendicants, who

have no property to tax, who merely make the city a

place of residence, who can take their satchej and mi-

grate in a moment. are allowed to vote. Every city of any

considerable population contains a large number of these

voters, called the floating vote. These are secured to sup-

port such candidates as now being considered. They not
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only vote for candidates, but they vote on all questions

of bonding the city where such question is submitted.

It is liberal but not equitable, that persons having no

property interests to protect or to tax should be permit-

ted to have a vote at municipal elections, when no ques-

tions of State or National polity are involved. There is

no question of their personal liberty involved, and hence,

they have no stake in the result.

14 MICHIGAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION.

Will it be urged that they have an interest in the em-

ployment of labor? It is a fact that this is urged by

corrupt candidates to secure the votes of this class. But

the question of employment is secondary to the primary

question of what improvements do the necessities of the

city require to be made. This must be determined not

by the necessities of labor, but by the necessities of pub-

lic use and convenience. It is needless to add, that

aldermen should themselves be tax-paying citizens.

The remedies to secure a better government and man-

agement of cities which I suggest, are of two kinds.

First, direct responsibility of the officers elected to the

people of the whole city. This can best be secured by

an annual election of a Mayor and two councilors upon a

general ticket made irrespective of party affiliations. To

these should be intrusted the execution of the powers and

duties now conferred by the charter upon the Common

Council. They should be intrusted with the whole power

of appointment. They should have supervision of the

several boards, and a power of negation over their ac-

tion. Their salaries should be nominal. Who would

serve ? The best men in the city would serve.

The city of Glasgow is said by Alfred Shaw, to be

the best regulated and best governed city in the world.

It is held up as a model, and no salaries are attached to

the office of aldermen or councilors, and the offices are
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filled by men of business—upright, respected and suc-

cessful citizens, who deem it an honor to be selected.

The city of Grand Rapids paid its aldermen a salary

of but one dollar a year for many years, and the offices

were filled by their best citizens, men of business and of

standing in the community. The Police and Fire Com-

missioners, constituting one of the most important boards

in the city, serve without pay. The best men would be
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elected to the positions. The people at large would not

see these responsible offices filled by unworthy or incom-

petent men. By annual elections, they would be directly

accountable for their stewardship to the judgment of the

people. Or;

Second, reduce the number of wards in the city

which now are twelve to not exceeding eight. Re-

duce the Common Council to a like number. Elect

the aldermen upon a general non-partisan ticket with the

Mayor and other elective city officers, but each alderman

to be selected by the mass convention from the ward in

which he resides. No one to be eligible unless a prop-

erty holder and tax payer, and no one qualified to vote

for any city officer except he is a property holder and tax

payer in the city. The reason for this has already been

stated. In addition it may be noted that non-tax payers

have no vote for municipal officers in the city of Glas-

gow, which Mr. Alfred Shaw regards an important con-

sideration in the municipal government of that city. An

alderman should be the representative of the whole city,

and not of a particular locality of that city. He is called

upon to vote upon questions that affect other localities

than his particular ward, and he should represent every

locality in the city.

It will be deduced from what has been said in this

paper, that the main object is to get fit men to fill the
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offices provided for by the charter. With such men in

office, every municipality would be :i model of self-gov-

ernment. "How to get fit men in office, and how to keep

unfit men out," in our cities, should interest every citizen,

every lover of our local institutions, until some method

is found and established by which it can be done. Until

this is secured, local self-government is a failure, and I

hesitate to believe that civilized men, reared in the at-
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mosphere of civil and religious liberty are unable to

grasp and successfully solve this problem.

I have only suggested remedies. It may be that such

as I have suggested would prove inefficient. If so, let

others be tried until success is accomplished; and may the

day bo far distant when it shall be decided that the only

remedy for the evils that have grown out of the adminis-

tration of city affairs is for the State to take virtual con-
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trol and rule the cities through its legislature.

